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An Experimental Examination of the Walrasian Tatonnement Mechanism 
LO Introduction 
Joyce (1984) reports results of experiments of a W alrasian tatonnement auction 
that show that the mechanism is stable, exhibits strong convergence properties and 
generates efficiency averaging better than 97%.1 He also found that when subjects could 
see part of the order flow (excess demand), price tended to be lower (favorable to 
buyers). His experiments consisted of a stationary environment where subjects were 
provided with single-unit supply and demand functions. This paper assesses the 
robustness of his results in a more complex setting and systematically investigates the 
effect of various order flow information and message restriction rules on the performance 
of the Walrasian mechanism. In particular, our subjects were provided with multi-unit 
demands and supplies where equilibrium price and subject values or costs were changed 
each trading period. 
Part of the motivation for our experiments 1s to assess the extent of the 
inefficiencies predicted by theory as follows: 
1. When there are both buyers and sellers in the market, each of which has one
unit to buy or sell, the only Nash equilibria of the Walrasian tatonnement mechanism 
are those that support the competitive equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, a W alrasian 
tatonnement process can be designed that has a dominant strategy equilibrium where 
each participant reveals value or cost (see McAffe (1990)). The design imposes 
constraints on participant messages; specifically, at the announced price at t, if excess 
demand is positive (negative), any seller (buyer) not registering a sell (buy) order at t 
cannot register an order at time t+l. Without this improvement rule the dominant 
strategy equilibrium outcome no longer exists. However, even with this improvement 
rule, the dominant strategy revelation property does not hold when demands and 
supplies are multi-unit, since a participant may influence price without being entirely 
out of the market. When suppliers and demanders have multiple units to trade, theory 
provides very little guidance to the market designer on the appropriate price discovery 
rules by which to organize a Walrasian tatonnement. 
1 Efficiency is defined as the percent of maximum producer and consumer surplus realized by a trading 
mechanism. 
2. The results reported in Noussair (1991) also raises questions about the
robustness of Joyce's results in an environment with multiple unit supply and demand. 
He shows that the isomorphism between the English auction (which gives full order flow 
information) and a uniform price sealed-bid auction (which gives no order flow 
information) does not hold when demands are multi-unit and multiple units are to be 
allocated. It seems reasonable to assess the impact of multi-unit supply and demand as 
well as the role of information on demand and supply conditions on the performance of 
the tatonnement auction. 
3. With prices sensitive to revealed supply and demand, the price adjustment
process2 in a tatonnement auction typically results in a Nash equilibrium in which 
participants underreveal demands and supplies (see Hurwicz (1972) and Otani and 
Sicilian (1990)). The strategic underrevelation can lead to outcomes that are different 
than the competitive equilibrium outcome. Without a consistency restriction placed on 
traders' messages in a Walrasian tatonnement, the revealed willingness to buy or to sell 
at a particular price are nonbinding (a form of cheap talk). Thus, we assess the impact 
of imposing a consistency requirement on subjects' bids and offers on the performance of 
the W alrasian mechanism. 
Not only is there a theoretical interest on the performance of the W alrasian 
mechanism, but there are field implementations of such a process where questions have 
been raised about its efficiency; the opening of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
and special opening and closing procedures on the Commodity Exchange Inc. 
(COMEX). At the opening on the NYSE, the specialist in each security listed on the 
exchange calls out prices until he or she finds the price that maximizes the volume of 
matched buy and sell order quantities submitted over the electronic system and those 
held by floor traders actively participating in the auction at the specialists' post. If 
there are more buys (sells) than sells (buys) and the specialist is not prepared to absorb 
the imbalance, the price is adjusted upward (downward). The efficiency of this process 
has been questioned by Amihud and Mendelson (1987) and Stoll and Whaley (1990) 
because of the inflated volatility of opening prices. Amihud and Mendelson (1991) 
compare day to <lay ·price volatility· and demonstrate tha-t ·there ·is less volatility of the 
call auction at the start of the afternoon session of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) 
2Price is adjusted in the direction of excess demand (downward if there are more sells than buys, upward if 
there are more buys than sells) 
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relative to the one at the start of the trading day, and suggest that less current 
information about supply and demand conditions may underlie the observed volatility 
at the opening. Bronfman and Schwartz (1992) provide theoretical support for the 
hypothesis that price discovery is particularly complex after a non-trading period. The 
COMEX has proposed a five minute period prior to the opening and close of every 
trading day during which brokers holding orders to buy and/or sell can attempt to 
match quantities in an open outcry (at a price to be determined during the opening or 
closing minute, respectively). The price at which these matched orders will be deemed 
to have traded is the unweighted "average" of the prices at which contracts traded 
during the opening or closing minute; that is, it gives equal weight to all execution 
prices and does not take into account the volume of trading at each price. Notice that 
this price will not have been determined when the matching of buy and sell quantities 
take place. Since rules matter in the performance of a mechanism, it is important to 
investigate the impact of different implementations of the Walrasian mechanism on 
market efficiency. 
Control over supply and demand conditions and the information provided to 
traders is impossible in the field, and therefore minimal conditions for studying the role 
of auction rules on price discovery are not possible. The use of laboratory methods in 
economics allows key parameters in the market to be under the control of the 
experimenter. In particular, using monetaryincentives, underlying demand and supply 
conditions can be induced so that equilibrium price and quantity exists and is known to 
the experimenter. Given the induced supply and demand environment, performance of 
a pricing institution (auction rules) in terms of the efficiency of price discovery and in 
the allocation of asset holdings can be assessed. In addition, the strategic behavior of 
subjects can be compared relative to fully revealing strategies. Our experiments are 
fully computerized allowing for greater control in differentiating private and public 
information and enforcing different message restrictions on subjects. 
In our experiments, the underlying supply and demand conditions allow for 
strategic price manipulation by buyers and sellers and the conditions are not stationary 
for each market period. This experimental environment provides a difficult test of the 
efficiency of price discovery and allocations for a Walrasian tatonnement mechanism. 
We also provide evidence on the performance of the Walrasian process under different 
levels of "transparency" (market information).3 For the Walrasian mechanism this 
3 
translate to providing information on the current buy and sell orders in the market and 
potential price movement. It is unclear whether such information can assist or hinder 
the market. In addition to the transparency issue, we also investigate the properties of 
bid-offer restriction rules that facilitate orderly price discovery. 
The basic results show that all versions of the computerized multiple unit 
W alrasian auction produces prices consistent the with the competitive equilibrium 
prediction. Unfortunately, the allocations fall short of the competitive prediction and 
result in efficiencies lower than those provided by a continuous double auction. Among 
all the W alrasian auction designs we tested, the treatment in which full order flow 
information is provide and there are no bid-offer restrictions performs best. As theory 
would predict, there is a strong correlation between per unit profit and the amount of 
underrevelation by players. Finally, unlike the result found by Joyce, we find no 
significant strategic behavior differences between buyers and sellers. 
2.0 Experimental Environment and Walrasian Auction Design
We first consider a simple experimental environment developed by Joyce (1984)
m his examination of the Walrasian auction. We then describe our multi-unit 
nonstationary supply and demand environment and computerized implementation of 
the W alrasian auction process. 
2.1 Baseline 
Consider the following environment faced by n buyers and n sellers of a single 
commodity. Each buyer has a value for a discrete single unit. Each seller has the 
capacity to supply only one discrete unit to the market for a fixed cost. Given the 
values and costs of the potential market participants, a supply and demand array can 
be constructed as in Figure 1, which we will call environment El. 
3Transparency is defined as the amount of real time information on quotes, transaction prices and volume 
that is disclosed. 
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The El Environment 
Supply 
Demand 
8 Quantity 
In the simple environment described in Figure 1, Joyce implements a specific 
Walrasian Auction as follows: 
1. An initial price P 0 > 0 is selected by an auctioneer.
2. Either:
a. With all participants present in the same room, each buyer and seller
indicates to the auctioneer whether they wanted to buy or sell a single unit at the 
announced price by raising their hand. However, only the auctioneer knew if a 
particular subject was a buyer or seller, that is, each trader's identity (buyer or seller) 
was his own private information; or 
b. "B11yers·and-sellers were in"·separaterooms. ·Thus, ·buyers could observe
the number of buy orders and sellers could observe the number of sell orders during 
each iteration and infer the opposite side's demand and supply at the end of each 
iteration. 
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3. If the number of buyers demanding a unit at that price equals the number of
sellers supplying a unit at that price, the process stops and a market was made. 
4. If there was an imbalance of supply and demand at that price, i.e. excess
demand E(P) was nonzero, the auctioneer updated the price using the following 
formula: 
$.05E(P) if IE(P)I > 1
$"Z"E(P) if IE(P)I = 1, where "Z" <$.05 
Under treatment 2a, participants were not told the exact imbalance of supply 
and demand. In all cases, current buy or sell messages were not constrained by past 
messages (there was no improvement rule), and the price adjustment rule was linear. 
However, there was a strong restriction placed on each participants' message; they could 
only register demands and supplies for one unit. 
2.2 Nash Equilibrium Strategies with Single Unit Demands and Supplies 
When individuals have demands or supplies for one unit nonrevelation is a risky 
strategy since, should the market clear, the-individual will fail to make a profitable 
transaction. If there is complete knowledge concerning values and costs, then in a 
nonrepeated process of this type, any pure strategy Nash equilibrium must be at 
(Qe,Pe)· This follows because at any outcome different than (Qe,Pe) those individuals 
using a nonrevealing strategy, that are not part of the allocation, would do better by 
revealing. In particular, with the arrays given in Figure 1, revelation is a Nash 
equilibrium. However, suppose that the market environment is as pictured in Figure 2. 
Then, if P0 > P, a Nash equilibrium is where one (or several) demanders with value 
greater than P do not reveal until price is at P and all sellers reveal. A similar result 
can be found for the case when P 0 < P; sellers with cost less than P do not reveal until 
price is at P. \Vi th full information on the order flow, the actual price determined in 
the auction period will be affected by the relative bargaining power of buyers and 
sellers, and to some extent, the initial price P 0 will affect each sides' ability to 
manipulate the outcome. However, with single unit demands and supplies, the only 
Nash equilibria are where the outcome is in the equilibrium "price tunnel" and all 
valuable units are traded. 
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If there is incomplete information about supply and demand, then individual 
participants must balance the probability of failing to make a profitable trade with the 
profits from affecting the final price by underrevealing. In this case, the competitive 
outcome need not be a Nash equilibrium and thus ex post inefficiencies can occur in 
equilibrium. In Joyce's study, his Walrasian auction had average efficiencies over 973.
Under the treatment 2b, prices were significantly lower than treatment 2a. This 
suggested that information on the actual amount of excess demand is important. 
From the simple example above, we can see that the W alrasian mechanism 
allows strategic ma..'1ipulation and that information concerning the composition of excess 
demand is important in determining an outcome. The questions that motivate our 
research are: 
a. Which rules result m greater efficiencies m a Walrasian Tatonnement
Process? 
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b. How well does the Walrasian mechanism perform when there are significant
opportunities to manipulate prices? 
c. How well does the mechanism perform in a non-stationary environment?
2.3 Multi-Unit Non-stationary Supply and Demand Environment 
Our experiments utilized five buyers and five sellers. The basic demand and 
supply configuration is provided in Figure 3. The aggregate supply and demand arrays 
are step functions where each step identifies a particular individual's value or cost. 
Only one trader is assigned to a step on these functions. In addition, each participant 
has multiple units to bid or to offer all on the same step. As shown in Figure 3, there 
are three buyers (Bl,B3,B5) and three sellers (Sl,S2,S3) endowed with six units and 
two buyers (B2,B4) and two sellers (S2,S3) endowed with three units. Thus, there are 
twenty-four buy and sell units in the market; of these, eighteen are potentially tradable 
within the equilibrium price tunnel [450,470].
Figure 3
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The parameter values described in Figure 3 were used in period 4 of our 
experiments. During an experiment, buyers remained buyers and sellers remained 
sellers, period to period, although two important changes occurred each period: 
1. The equilibrium prices was changed by parallel and equal shifts m the
aggregate demand and supply arrays. In particular, from period to period, a random 
constant from the interval [100,490] is added to (or subtracted from) each step on the 
aggregate demand and supply functions. In period 4, the steps on the demand function 
correspond to the prices 500, 490, 480, 4 70, 450, 440, 430, and 420; the midpoint of the 
equilibrium price tunnel was 460. If the price at the midpoint of the equilibrium price 
tunnel in the next period was 250, the steps on the demand function would be 290, 280, 
270, 260, 240, 220, 200, and 180. This change is a result of the demand and supply 
curves being shifted downward by 210, with their basic shape and point of intersection 
unchanged. 
2. Buyers and sellers relative competitiveness changes. This takes place as
follows: within each period, buyers are assigned (by a random rotation procedure) to one 
of the demand steps (Bl-B5), and sellers are assigned to one the the supply steps (Sl­
S5). Each period they are assigned to a new step. For example, buyer 1 who in period 
4 was endowed with the right to resell up to 6 units at a price of 500, could find himself 
or herself on a step with 6 units, but with no tradable units within the equilibrium price 
tunnel, as is buyer 5 in Figure 3. Alternatively, she could be on a step with only three 
units and where she can influence the price aidhe marginal buyer (as is buyer 4). 
Thus, there are always 18 units to be traded at the competitive equilibrium 
price, always five steps on the demand function with buyers distributed one to a step, 
and always five steps on the sell function with sellers distributed one to a step. This 
experimental environment, which we will identify as E2, allows us to assess the 
performance of the Walrasian auction in an environment where participants have 
multiple units and where relative competitiveness is variable period to period. This 
environment has been used in previous experimental studies (see Campbell et al. (1991) 
and McCabe et al. (1991)) and has been shown to provide a difficult test for price 
discovery. The environment, from the participants perspective, seems to be changing 
each period· an<l t1J.u.,,·re!yingon past· market·dat·a··'Can· hmderprice·discovery. 
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2.4 W alrasian Auction Design and Computerized Implementation 
A W alrasian tatonnement must specify the following rules in order to implement 
the auction: 
1. The process must determine a starting or initial price P 0.
For each experiment a set of initial prices was selected from three possible 
vectors. The vectors were determined as follows: Let Pe= (Pe1,. ... ,P
en) be the vector
of equilibrium prices for periods 1 to n. Let Bi be a random variable drawn from the
interval [-50,50] for each i=l, . . .,n. Let v. be a random variable drawn from the interval I 
[-25,25). The first vector of initial prices was P10 = (Pel - e1, ... ,P
en - Bn); the second
initial price vector was given by P2 0 = -P10; the third vector was given by p3 0 = (Pe 1
- v1, ... ,P
en - vn)· These initial price vectors were used to investigate the affect of the
opening price on price discovery. 
u. The price adjustment function <, 4 
pt =Pt-1+<(Dt-l,St-1)
The price adjustment rule we use m our experiments is piece-wise linear. 
Specifically, after 4 iterations the adjustment factor < used in the previous four 
iterations was halved. 5 Notice that this piecewise adjustment rule reduces the benefits 
from nonrevelation because as the number of iterations increases, it takes a larger 
imbalance to significantly adjust the price. In our experiments, the following form of 
this piecewise rule was used: 
where [Y] denotes the greatest integer less than or equal to y and t is the current 
iteration in the period. For example, at iteration 6 with an announced price of 200 and 
reported excess demanded of 10, the price next period will be 210. Unlike the 
experiments conducted by Joyce, our experiments are computerized and thus there is no 
human auctioneer judgment on "appropriate" price changes. 
4 We define Dt =(D0(P0), D1(P1), ..... ,Dt(Pt)), St ::;::($0(P0),S1(P1), ... St{Pt)) as the aggregate supply and 
demand responses for each price iteration up to Pt and ni t•gi t the individual supply and demand responses for each 
price iteration up to Pt. We will represent the true demands and supplies with the lower case letters, �·st,d\,iJt. 
5 We define an iteration as the time between two successive price changes and a period as the time between 
two successive allocations. 
1 0  
m. The order flow information available to participants, i.e. the information
available to participant i during iteration t, 
Notice that this construction can include information on the current iteration buy and 
sell orders so that real-time information updates can be included. It also allows for basic 
market statistics (µ) such as the number of active participants, etc. 
As has been noticed by Joyce (1986) and Noussair (1991), information supplied 
to players concerning the composition of excess demand can have a pronounced effect 
on the outcome of a tatonnement process. In our experiments, we consider two 
alternative information structures: minimum information and complete order flow
information. Under the minimum information treatment, subjects are told (on their 
computer screens) the current trial price, the adjustment factor for the current trial, the 
number of seconds remaining for the current trial, and a full history of past trial prices 
and past order flow imbalances. However, they are given no information on any 
imbalance at the current price. 
Our second treatment provides subjects with order flow information as well. In 
addition to the information in the minimum information treatment, subjects are 
provided at each trial with the real-time updated buy and sell orders as they arrived 
during the current price iteration, and what the next iteration price would be, based on 
the current imbalance information. Allowing participants to see the exact real time 
composition of buy and sell imbalances allows for individuals to update their strategies 
which can either hinder or assist in the price discovery process. The usefulness 
(efficiency promoting) of order flow information will likely depend on the underlying 
environment under study. In our experimental design the environment is not 
stationary. Therefore, this continual shifting equilibrium price also allows us to assess 
the effects of order flow information on the speed of price discovery. 
iv. A message restriction specification limits the messages that can be sent, i.e.
(Dit(Pt),s
i
t(Pt)) E M
i(nit,s
i
t)
This rule restricts the potential buy and sell orders that can be placed during 
iteration t as a function of past responses. In all replications we placed the following 
restrictions on the messages participants could send at each iteration: 
1. Individuals could not sell short or buy on margin. Thus, individuals
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were not permitted to offer more units than their maximum capacity or demand more 
units than they had positive values. 
2. Once an order was sent to the market it could not be canceled.
In several replications we put additional restrictions on subject messages. We 
imposed a restriction rule that requires a buyer who was willing to purchase m units at 
a price Y to be willing to purchase AT LEAST m units at prices lower than Y. 
Similarly, a seller who was willing to sell n units at at price Z must be willing to sell AT 
LEAST n units at prices above Z. For example, a buyer who is willing to buy 2 units 
at a price of 325 may state he or she is willing to purchase only 1 unit at a price of 290. 
This kind of inconsistency makes it difficult for participants to update their priors on 
the shape of the underlying demand and supply conditions. The motivation for this rule 
was to restrict inconsistency to allow for more consistent conjectures by subjects. 
This rule does not prevent withholding, but it does minimize inconsistency. 
Thus a subject who was willing to buy 2 units at 325 is not precluded from revealing 
later in the period that in fact he or she is willing to buy 3 units at 325. A seller who 
was willing to sell only 1 unit at 340 can in the end agree to sell 4 units at 340. The 
rule is flexible enough to permit subjects to explore their relative competitiveness; 
however, it does limit "reneging". 
v. Finally, a stopping rule defines the amount of time (w) allowed for making
buy and sell order decision for an iteration (t) and the rule (t*) to end the period (¢) 
and determine a final allocation X* and price P*. These are defined by: 
wt = O(D
i
t,s
i
tl
t* ¢ = Q(D
¢
t,S
¢
tl
(P*, X*) = H(Dt*'
S
t*
)
The stopping rule used in our experiments has two dimensions. First during an 
iteration, the time remaining to submit an order was endogenous. A clock was set at 15 
seconds when the iteration price was posted. Any new order quantity submitted at the 
price reinitialized the clock to 15 seconds. This rule provided an implementation of a 
"soft close" procedure. A soft close enforces a unanimity requirement in that no one 
can guarantee ·himself, or·· herself·the ·last say. The �=d -dimenSion dealt with the 
exact close of the market period. We closed the market period, at trial t*, when 
Pt*=Pt*-l or E(Pt*)=O. Notice that given our price adjustment rule, this stopping rule
does not imply that E(P) = 0. Thus, if at t*, E(Pt*) fc 0, we ration by a time priority. 
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A strategy S in this game is a mapping from past order flow information given. . 
the price adjustment, restriction and stopping rules, i.e., S\: (Pt, I(t); M1( . ) , <(. ),
0(. ), Q(. ) , H( ·),di, si) ..... (Dit,sit)· The final allocation will depend on the interaction
of all these rule specifications on the strategies that participants select. 
3.0 Experimental Design
Figure 4 shows the computer screens that subjects were viewing. Order flow 
information is provided in the lower middle box. Under the minimum information 
treatment, the only information provided in this box is the current iteration price (this 
is referred to as Potential Price on the subject screen). In all treatments, past trials and 
imbalances are recorded in the lower left-hand box, and the subjects current submitted 
quantity (and the number of profitable units at the current price) are recorded in the 
lower right-hand box. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the experimental treatments and the number of 
experiments conducted per cell in our design. The design consists of two factors 
(improvement rule and order flow information) which are either present or not in each 
experiment. 
experiments. 
Appendix A contains an abbreviated set of instructions used in the 
Table 1
Experimental Treatments* 
(Number of experiments conducted is listed in cells) 
Information 
Minimal Order Flow 
Message R.P--Striction 
No 4 5 
Yes 3 3 
* All of our treatments were conducted by using the piece-wise linear price adjustment rule described in this section. 
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Unit 
Value 
1 Price 
Profit 
Value 
2 Price 
Profit 
Value 
3 Price 
Profit 
Value 
4 
Iteration� P (BUY) 
2 -2 385(1) 
1 5 360(2) 
4.0 Experimental Results 
Figure 4
Computer Display 
Period 
10 11 
400 
350 
200 
100 
Potential Price 
� 
Adjustment Factor:
2 
Buys Sells 
@:] @=] 
4.1 The Simple Environment 
12 13 
Your current buy order: j 1 units I 
Profitable Units: 1
In order to test the computer implementation of the W alrasian Tatonnement 
mechanism, we'-conducted, tw<r"'Xperiments·usingthe·environment described in Figure 5
which we call ElC. This environment is similar to the El environment used by Joyce. 
These two replications allow us to check our procedures and compare the results of our 
computerized tatonnement with the oral auction version reported in Joyce. 
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In both Joyce and our experiments, subjects were endowed with single unit 
supplies and demands, and there was a _ 20 cent range defining the competitive 
equilibrium price. Price above the midpoint of this tunnel give greater surplus to 
sellers, and price below to the buyers. In our experiments, the tunnel was defined by 
subject valuations and costs; in Joyce's design, it was created by providing subjects with 
a 10 cent commission for each trade. In both experiments, subjects were paid the 
difference between their limit price and the market clearing price (plus the commission 
in Joyce). 
Table 2 shows the mean efficiency (percent of the maximum producer plus 
consumer surplus generated) for periods 1-6 and periods 7+ for both the El and ElC 
environments. The efficiencies are high in later periods. However, in the computerized 
implementation of the mechanism there is a significant increase in efficiency in later 
periods of an experiment. 
Result 1: A comparison of the efficiencies in periods 1-6 with that for periods beyond
period 6 shows that efficiencies significantly increase with El C and there is no
15 
significant change with El. 
Support: The t-statistic is 2.25 for El C and -1.64 for El. 
Table 2
Mean Efficiency By Periods for ElC and El
ElC El 
Periods 1-6 85.3 98.9 
(1.8) (2.6) 
Periods 7+ 97.7 96.3 
(5.6) (6.1) 
We also tested for differences in efficiency between the oral auctions conducted 
by Joyce and our computerized auction and found that they are not different for periods 
7+. The strong period effect in the computerized treatment relative to the oral 
implementation is consistent with the results found in Williams (1980) where 
convergence to the competitive equilibrium price was slower with a computerized versus 
an oral implementation of a continuous bid-offer trading system. 
Result 2: There is no significant difference in-efficiency between the El and El C cases.
Support: The t-statistic for periods 7 + is .605. 
In terms of price formation, there is no difference between the computerized 
implementation and the oral implementation. Prices lie in the equilibrium price tunnel, 
near the midpoint (see Figure 6). This suggests that the Nash equilibrium prediction 
for single unit demand and supply is supported by this data, 1.e., the Competitive 
Equilibrium outcome. 
Result 3: There is no significant difference in the distribution of prices between the El 
and El C cases.
Support: For periods 7+, the t-statistic is .T06 (p-va1ue = .90). 
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Figure 6 
Price Dispersion Relative to CE Midpoint Price
95 % Confidence Intervals
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For the remainder of this paper, we will use the following abbreviations for 
the treatments in our design: FINI = Full Information with No bid-offer restriction; 
NINI = No Information with No bid-offer restriction; FU = Full Information with bid­
offer restriction; NII = No Information with bid-offer restriction . 
Figure 7 shows the efficiency distribution (boxplots) for each of the four 
treatments in our implementation of the W alrasian auction in the E2 environment. 
The boxplots show the median, interquartiles, the 10th and 90th percentile caps. The 
5th and 95th percentiles are shown as symbols below and above the caps. In addition to 
the Walrasian treatments, we report the results of 6 baseline double auction (DA) 
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experiments using the E2 environment. A double auction is a real-time continuous 
process in which traders submit bids and offers with the bid-offer spread determined by 
a standard bid-ask improvement rule. The DA has been used extensively in 
experimental studies of markets and has the robust capacity to implement the 
Competitive Equilibrium outcome. The time series of efficiency for each experimental 
treatment can be found in Appendix B. 
Figure 7 
Distribution of Efficiency of Walrasian Auction Treatments and DA Baseline 
Periods 1-6 Periods 7+ 
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Notice that the DA has a very tight distribution, while the Walrasian treatments 
have a large dispersion in efficiency. 
Result 4: The,.lJAoutpe'l'f-0rms·each fJjthe•Walrasian··iliU-ctfon designs 11Je tested. FINI 
performs best among the Walrasian auction treatments. 
Support: An ANOVA was undertaken based on the following dummy variable 
regression: 
1 8  
NINI 
Fil 
NII 
DA 
Efficiency = "'l DA*Periodsl-6 + 111 FINhPeriodsl-6 + .... . + a2DA*Periods7+
+ ,q5FINhPeriods7+ + .... . +, 
Table 3 supplies the outcome of this regression and the associated statistics. 
Table 3
ANOVA Estimates on Efficiency 
Indegendent Variable Estimated Coefficient StaJ;Jdard Error 
DA*Periodsl-6 85.344 1.663 
FINhPeriodsl-6 83.000 1.358 
NINhPeriodsl-6 80.720 3.036 
FihPeriodsl-6 83.667 3.030 
NihPeriodsl-6 85.125 2.629 
DA*Periods7+ 94.619 1.358 
FINhPeriods7 + 91.718 2.062 
NINhPeriods7 + 84.031 2.526 
FihPeriods7+ 85.082 2.630 
NihPeriods7 + 88.147 2.209 
Result 5: Each treatment yields an increase in efficiency in later periods.
Support: Additional support is provided by the results reported in Table 3. 
Result 6: The following efficiency rankings, for periods 7+, show that only the full
information without improvement (FINI} treatment approaches the efficiency of the 
double auction.: DA =FINI 2: NII= FI!= NINI.
We can ascertain the following comparative static results. 
i. Conditional on having no bid-offer restriction rule, full-information helps in
obtaining more efficient allocations. 
ii. Conditional on only minimal .information being ,provided, the restriction rule
helps in obtaining more efficient allocations. However, the level of efficiency does not 
approach that of FINI or DA. 
With respect to price formation, Figure 8 shows the price dispersion relative to 
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the competitive equilibrium price tunnel. From the boxplots it is easy to see that each 
treatment results in prices that lie within the tunnel. However, the low efficiencies 
reported in Table 3 show that the supply and demand match is not correct, and 
suggests the presence of significant underrevelation on both sides of the market: if one 
side underreveals to gain an advantage, the other side underreveals to neutralize that 
advantage. 
Figure 8 
Price Dispersion Around the CE Price Midpoint
Periods 1-6 Periods 7+ 
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To see if the final price is dependent on the initial price P 0 we estimate the 
following equation for each treatment for periods 7+:6 
20 
LEGEND 
0 FINI
• NINI
v Fii 
"" NII 
0 DA 
(Revealed Price - Actual Price) = a + ,8(Revealed Price - Actual Price) + < 
Result 7: In no treatment does the initial price have an effect on the final price obtained 
in the market. 
Support: 
The estimates are: 
Treatment Q. 
FINI -2.65 
NINI 3.69 
FII -0.84 
NII 0.26 
Standard Error 
1.45 
1.61 
1.93 
1.28 
/J. 
-.0256 
-.0290 
-.0560 
.0330 
Standard Error 
.0578 
.0486 
.0860 
.0520 
Before we investigate individual behavior, we consider the relationship between 
the number of iterations and the efficiency of each treatment. Under price taking 
behavior that the process should stop within 2 iterations. This rarely happened in any 
of our treatments so that significant misrepresentation was occurring. Since subjects 
are trying to discover price and determine the terms of trade, an increase in the number 
of iterations may reflect more strategic withholding resulting in lower efficiencies. 
Result 8: The number of iterations required to match supply and demand has an
insignificant effect on efficiency for all of the Walrasian treatments. Significantly more 
price iterations are required to clear the market with the improvement rule. 
Support: The following regression (for periods 7+) was estimated: 
Efficiency = a + ,a( iterations) + < 
The estimates are: 
Treatment Q. Standard Error fl. Standard Error 
FINI 96.9 3.97 -.83 .54 
NINI 89.3 4.27 -.89 .52 
FII . 90.4 5.72 -.56 :5{) 
NII 77.7 4.65 1.18 .52 
Average� Period 
Number of Iterations 
6.30 
6.77 
8.57 
9.75 
6Revealed price is defined as the price that would have occurred if every participant acted as a price taker in 
the market. 
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Result 8 reflects the difficult strategic problem faced by traders in a W alrasian 
auction. When there is no order flow information and trading strategies are constrained 
in subsequent iterations by the improvement rule (NII), slow revelation of demand is 
not risky in so far that it allows subjects to assess their relative competitiveness. 
However, underrevelation can result in an inefficient market clearing. 
4.3 Individual Behavior 
Three types of individual behavior can be identified in our experiments: 
( 1) Overrevelation: A buy or sell response that can result in a marginal loss in 
profit if the proces.s stops, i.�., for each iteration t and participant i at the price Pt 7 
D\(Pt) > d\(Pt) 
s\(Pt) > Jt(Pt)
(2) Underrevelation: A buy or sell response that is less than the number units 
that are profitable at the current price 
nit(Pt) < d
i
tCPt)
sitCPt) < JtCPt)
(3) Revelation: A buy or sell response that contains all profitable units and no 
unprofitable units at the current price 
�
i
tCPt) = �
i
tCPt)
S\(P tl = s\(P t) 
For each treatment, less than 3 percent of responses are consistent with 
underrevelation. For periods 7+, the number of responses that are consistent with 
overrevelation is less than 1 percent. Thus, overrevelation is a very rare occurrence in 
the Walrasian market treatments. If we only focus on cases in which positive profits 
can be made at the current price, there can be no cases of overrevelation since we have 
imposed short-selling restrictions. Thus, under the condition of positive profits, the 
table below shows the percent of responses consistent with underrevelation. 
Table 4 shows that both buyers and sellers underreveal .nearly one, third of the 
time. In FII, over 65% of the buyer responses are consistent with underrevelation. 
7 Recall that uppercase letters represent actual aggregate supply and demand responses while lowercase letter 
represent true demand and supply functions. 
2 2  
Notice that under our improvement rule, in later periods, once a buyer (seller) has 
revealed a willingness to purchase (sell) x units at a particular price, he or she is 
required to purchase (sell) that many units at a lower (higher) price; therefore, 
underrevealing at the beginning of a period is the only way to obtain strategic 
bargaining room for later in a period. 
Table 4
Percent Underrevelation Responses by Type, Treatment and Periods 
Treatment Periods 1-6 Periods 7+ 
Buyers Sellers Buyers Sellers 
FINI 33 38 31 35 
NINI 33 34 37 26 
FII 37 33 66 38 
NII 39 31 40 37 
Table 4 suggests that underrevelation is common. Indeed, there are no cases in 
which a subject always reveals in every iteration and period of an experiment. 
However, if we only consider the final outcomes of a period in an experiment, we can 
investigate the distribution of underevelatiol! by subjects. In Figure 9, for periods 7+, 
the sum of units underrevealed in the last iteration of each period was determined for 
each treatment, and then the sum of the units underrevealed in the last iteration of a 
period by each subject in a treatment was determined; the percent of underrevealed 
units by subjects is provided in the figure. For example, in the case of buyers, in all 
treatments, approximately one-half of the buyers account for all the underrevealed 
units. Alternatively, approximately half of the buyers were revealing by the end of a 
period. 
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Figure 9 
Distribution of Underrevelation Responses 
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Result 9: By the end of a period, nearly one-half of all buyers reveal and one-third of all
sellers reveal. 
participants. 
In general, underrevelation is concentrated among a few of the 
If we focus on the underrevelation cases and determine what influences the 
amount underrevealed, theory shows that an underrevealing strategy is undertaken 
because the foregone profit on the unrevealed units is more than compensated for on the 
low /higher price paid/received on the accepted units. Thus, there should be an effect 
on the amount of underrevelation on the part of a subject based on per unit profit. The 
following equatian -was estimated for each -treatment {for perfod -7 +):
# units underrevealed = a + f3 (per unit profit) + 'Y (buyer/ seller dummy) + < 
We would predict that a < 0 , /3 > 0 and -y=O. Table 5 presents the estimates of 
this equation. 
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Table 5
U nderrevelation Estimates*
Treatment .!! J1. 1 R2 
FINI -4.75 .057 .27 .34 
(.15) (.0049) ( .21) 
NINI -4.29 .0520 .30 .28 
( .16) (.0057) (.23) 
NII -4.14 .0301 .05 .18 
(.17) (.004) (.24) 
FI! -4.36 .056 -.42 .40 
(.16) (.006) (.23) 
* Standard error are listed in parentheses under each estimate.
Result 10: For all treatments, the amount of underrevelation is significantly effected by
per unit profits. The level of underevelation is not significantly different between buyers 
and sellers. 
5.0 Summary 
Walras's knowledge of the operations of the Paris Bourse and his need for a price 
adjustment mechanism that, in principle, could coordinate general equilibrium price 
adjustments led him to introduce into the economics literature the mechanism that 
bears his name. Its theoretical appeal was to define a virtual, or 'fictitious play' process 
which allowed the dispersed information of agents to be aggregated before binding 
contracts could occur. This characteristic allowed one to finesse the complexity of path 
dependent processes that result if contracts occur out of equilibrium. This feature no 
doubt accounts for the extensive theoretical study of its dynamic and stability 
properties. While the tatonnement has been found to be unstable in multiple markets, 
this research has left open its potential for application to single market price calls in 
securities and other" markets.
Joyce was the first to examine this mechanism empirically (some 100 odd years 
after Walras's work), and found that it performed well in single unit per person 
environments using a human auctioneer. We find that all versions of the computerized 
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multiple unit Walrasian auction perform less efficiently than the continuous double 
auction. The full information version, however, with no restrictions on bid-offer 
behavior, performs best. Since the Paris Bourse used a Walrasian process until 
recently, and it has a similar long application to the London Bullion price 'fixing' 
(Jarecki, 1976), why, given its relatively poor efficiency properties, has it been so 
durable? A likely possibility is that it works in field applications because it uses a live 
auctioneer, better informed and more flexible than a computer algorithm, and able to 
avoid backtracking or to minimize its effects. An alternative possibility is that 
mechanisms survive in the field for historical and other reasons unrelated to efficiency. 
With the decline of interest in general equilibrium theory and the concomitant 
ascendancy of work in game theory, other auction mechanisms, popular throughout the 
world of commodity and financial markets, have been exposed to theoretical and 
empirical examination. A comparison of alternative call market mechanisms shows 
clearly that backtracking mechanisms, such as the Vickrey (1976) version of the 
multiple unit English auction perform badly relative to the one-sided convergence 
characterized by the English clock auction (McCabe, Rassenti and Smith, 1991). This 
result is robustly corroborated in two-sided auctions using the 'Dutch English' (DE) 
Clock mechanism (McCabe, Rassenti and Smith, 1992a). In the latter a price clock is 
started high; buyers report their dem.and quantities (say QD), and sellers report their 
supply quantity (say Qs>QD). As the clock price ticks down, buyers enter and QD 
increases, sellers exit and QS decreases, until QD=Qs and QS units are sold to the 
active buyers. In the DE procedure, buyers who enter must commit; sellers who exit 
cannot reenter. If there is an overshoot, the penultimate trial becomes binding and the 
long side is rationed. Consequently, DE is like a Walrasian adjustment process but with 
tighter controls on exit/entry -- a Walrasian auction with a heavy-handed auctioneer, if 
you like. An obvious disadvantage of DE is that if new disrupting information arrives 
during a call, the committed traders cannot escape. 
The principles here seem clear. Efficiency and strategy proofness can be 
enhanced by restricting the message space of traders. Prices are called exogenously, 
responses are restricted to exit/entry commitments-·fhat are binding, and backtracking 
is ruled out. An alternative to requiring commitment is to levy a charge for pulling 
your bid or offer. This provides an incentive to commit, but still escape. This could 
lead to a 'premature' stop with rationing or a 'failed' market. The latter of course may 
be desirable since it leads to a restart of the auction, when you want to restart expost 
new� inforn1ation. 
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The charge approach to the incentive problem is used effectively by the Arizona 
Stock Exchange (AZX). A commission is charged by AZX for a trade, but you pay it if 
you pull your bid (offer), and pay it again if you reenter. AZX is a uniform price 
double auction call market with open display of all bids and offers in real time. 
Currently the call is for one hour after the New York exchanges close. This mechanism 
was found to be as efficient as the continuous double auction in a stochastic 
environment examined by McCabe, Rassenti and Smith (1992b). 
The results of our examination of the W alrasian mechanism show that it lacks 
robustness in environments in which multi-unit demands and supplies are present and 
there is little depth at the margin, so that underrevelation has a direct influence on 
price. Traders act strategically by underrevealing and in the process there is an 
incorrect match between supply and demand. The outcome results in approximately 
the correct price signal, but in order to support this price, both sides strategically under 
reveal. 
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Appendix A 
Abbreviated Set of Instructions 
B uver 1 T t a onnemen t A t ·  UC i on 
Per i od 
Un i t  1 2 3 4 5 
Va l ue 4fHJ 
1 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Va l ue 3 5.0" 
2 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Va l ue 2.0".0" 
3 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Above you w i l l  f i nd a record sheet . The numbers i n  your 
persona l record sheet may be d i  f fer::ent and m_ay chang_e __ between 
per i ods i n  the actua l e�er i mep+ , 1 ne rows ! abe ! ea w i th the 
worcl · va l ue '  represent the va lues to you ( i n  cents) o f  
purchas i ng each o f  the i nd i cated un i ts .  
Each va l ue may be thought o f  as the pr i ce the exper i mentor 
w i l l  pay you for that un i t  i f  you can purchase i t  and then 
rese l 1 i t  to h i m .  A l  1 va l ues w i  1 1  be i n  cents ( . .0" 1  do l l ar) .
You are BUYER 1 for the who l e  e�eri ment . 
Press -NEXT- to cont i nue . 
2 8  
B uyer 1 T t a onnemen t A t ·  UC i on 
Per i od 
Un i t 1 2 3 4 
Va l ue 4kl.0" 
1 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Va l ue 3 5kl 
2 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Va l ue 2.0"kl 
3 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
New va l ues w i l l  be g i ven to you pr i or t o  the 
beg i nn i ng o f  each per i od .  They may or may not be 
the same as those for the prev i ous per i od .  
Press -NEXT- t o  cont i nue or - BACK- t o  rev i ew .  
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5 
B uyer 1 T t a onnemen t A t .  UC i on 
Per i od 
Un i t  1 2 3 4 5 
Va l ue 4.0' .0' 
1 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Va l ue 3 5.0' 
2 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Va l ue 2.0'.0' 
3 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
The ma i n  t h i ng t o  remember i s  that your cash pro f i ts w i l l
depend upon your ab i l i ty to buy a un i t  at a pr i ce be l ow 
i t s  va 1 ue . Any l_2ss (Qr�f i + < .0') from buy i ng a
un i t  above i ts va l ue w i l l  be deducted from yuur
total pro f i t s .  
 
Pro f i ts are accumu l ated over the who l e  exper i ment , 
w i th your t ot a l  pro f i ts at the end o f  the exper i ment 
be i ng the summat i on o f  your pro f i ts over a l l per i ods . 
Press -NEXT- to cont i nue or -BACK- to rev i ew .
3 0  
Instructions without order flow information 
B uyer 1 T t a onnemen t A t ·  UC i on 
Per i od 
Un i t 1 2 3 4 
Va l ue 4.0' .0' 
1 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Va l ue 3 5.0' 
2 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Va l ue 2.0'.0' 
3 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
When the number o f  buy orders does not equa l the 
the number o f  se l l  orders , the tr i a l  pr i ce w i l l  be 
changed. The adj ustment in tr i a l  pr i ce i s  g i ven by : 
Adj ustment factor x ( BUY . orders - SELL orders) 
5 
The va l ue o f  the adj ustment factor used to determ i ne t he 
next t r i a l  pr i ce i s  a l ways shown above the center box. 
Press < NEXT > to cont i nue or < BACK > to rev i ew 
Adj ustment factor : 5 . .0'.0' 
I Tr i a l  5-S P (BUY) Tr i a l  1 Pr i ce Your current buy order : 
1 5 3 6 .0' (2) 
3 1  
j 2 un i ts I 
J Pro f i tab l e  un i ts = 1 
B uyer 1 T t a onnemen t A t ·  UC l On 
Per i od 
Un i t  1 2 3 4 5 
Va l ue 4.0".0" 
1 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Va l ue 3 5.0" 
2 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Va l ue 2.0".0" 
3 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
I n  our examp l e ,  we eee that the pr i ce for the next 
tr i a 1 w i 1 1  be i ncreaeed by 2 5 cente = [ 5 • .0".0' x (2.0" - 1 5) ] • 
So the pr i ce for tr i a l  *2 w i  1 1  be 3 8 5  C<::1 1 L o  � .:i o .18 + <: 5J .
In the upcom i ng exper i ment the adj uetment factor w i l l
etart at 2 and w i l l  be ha l ved every 4 tr i a l e .  
Preee < NEXT > t o  cont i nue or < BACK > t o  rev i ew 
Adj uetment factor : 5 • .0".0" 
Tr i a l  B-S P (BUY) 
1 5 3 6 .0"  (2) 
I 
Tr i a l  1 Pr i ce 
3 2  
Your current buy order : 
I 2 un i te I 
I ' Pro f i tab l e  un i te = 1 
! 
B uyer 1 T t a onnemen t A t ·  UC i on 
Per i od 
Un i t  1 2 3 4 5 
Va l ue 4.0'.0' . .. 
1 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Va l ue 3 5.0' 
2 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Va l ue 2.0'.0' 
3 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
I f  at some l ater tr i a l  the adj ustment factor i s  on l y
. 5.0' and there are 2 more se l l s  than buys , then the next 
t r i a l  pr i ce wou l d  decrease by - 1  cents ( . 5 .0' x (- 2) ) . But 
i f  the factor were on l y  . 1 2 5 ,  then the pr i ce a j ustment , 
. 1 2 5 x (- 2 ) = - . 2 5 ,  wou l d  be l ess than ha l f  a cent and t he 
pr i ce wou l d  not change at a l l .  At that po i nt the per i od 
wou l d  end , the current tr i a l  pr i ce wou l d  become the market 
pr i ce ,  and the l ast 2 sel l orders wou l d  not be executed . 
Press < NEXT > to cont i nue or < BACK> to rev i ew 
Adj ustment factor : 5 • .0'.0' 
Tr i a l  B-S P (BUY) 
1 5 3 6 .0'  (2) 
I 
Tr i a l  1 Pr i ce 
3 3  
Your current buy order : 
1 2 un i t s  I 
Pro f i tab l e  un i ts = 1 I 
Instructions with the bid-offer improvement rule 
B uyer 1 T t a onnemen t A t ·  UC i on 
Per i od 
Un i t  1 2 3 4 
Va l ue 
1 Pr i ce 3 7 5  Pro f i t  2 5  
Va l ue 3 5.0" 
2 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Va l ue 2 .0".0" 
3 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
There are rest r i ct i ons that w i l l  be p l aced on the 
orders you make i n  t h i s  market . As a buyer you can 
on l y  subm i t  buy orders . In add i t i on ,  your buy order 
quant i ty must i mprove upon any prev i ous ord_er quant i t y  
at a l ess favorab l e  .. tr i a l  pr i ce .  I he i mprovement ru l e
works as fo l l ows . 
Press �NEXT� to cont i nue or �BACK� to rev i ew 
Adj ustment factor : 5 . .0".0" 
5 
Tr i a l  B-S P (BUY) Tr i a l  3 Pr i ce Your current buy order : 
2 - 2  3 8 5  ( 1 )  
1 5 3 6.0" (2) 
3 4  
I 1 un i ts I 
Pro f i tab l e  un i ts = 1 
B uyer 1 T t a onnemen t A t ·  UC i on 
Per i od 
Un i t  1 2 3 4 
Va l ue 
1 Pr i ce 3 7 5  Pro f i t  2 5  
Va l ue 3 5.0' 
2 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Va l ue 2 .0'.0' 
3 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Your orders must be cons i stent . I f  you are w i l l i ng 
to buy 2 un i ts at 3 5 5 , you must be w i l l i ng to buy 
at l east 2 un i ts at a l ower pr i ce ,  say , 3 5 .0' .  The 
computer remembers your order quant i ty at every tr i a l  
pr i ce .  I f  i n  the current per i od there has been one 
or severa l pr i ces h i gher than the current t r i a l  pr i ce ,  
your order box w i l l  d i sp l ay the l argest order quant i ty 
that you prev i ous l y  subm i tt ed .  I f  you try to subm i t  a 
l esser quant i ty the computer w i l l  i gnore your order . 
Press < NEXT> to cont i nue or < BACK > to rev i ew 
Adj ustment factor : 5 . .0'.0' 
5 
Tr i a l  B-S P (BUY) Tr i a l  3 Pr i ce Your current buy order : 
2 - 2  3 8 5  ( 1 )  
1 5 3 6 .0'  (2) 
j 
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j 1 un i ts I 
Pro f i tab l e  un i ts = 1 I 
B uver 1 T t a onnemen t A t ·  UC i on 
Per i od 
Un i t 1 2 3 4 5 
Va l ue 45.0" 
1 Pr i ce 3 7 5  Pro f i t  2 5  
Va l ue 3 5.0" 4 1 .0"  
2 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Va l ue 2 .0".0" 4.0".0" 
3 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Not i ce that the computer s i mp l y  i gnores new orders for 
l ess than 3 un i ts .  Your de fau l t  order i s  2 un i ts at the 
current t r i a l  pr i ce o f  3 9.0" .  Now subm i t  an i mproved order 
for 3 un i t s  and observe the market resu l ts .
Adj ustment factor : 5 . .0".0" 
Tr i a l  B-S P (BUY) Tr i a l  3 Pr i ce Your current buy order : 
� j 2 un i ts j 2 - 8  43.0" (.0") 1 6 4.0".0" (2) 
Type a new order ( > 2) t'> 
Pro f i tab l e  un i t s  = 3 
3 6  
Remember that the adj ustment ,factor for the upcom i ng
exper i ment w i l l , start at 2 and be ha l ved every 4 t ri a l s .  
Th i s  l i m i ts the number o f  poss i b l e  pr i ces wh i ch w i l l  be 
t r i ed .  The per i od ends and the current t r i a l  pr i ce 
becomes the market pr i ce when e i ther : 
or 
1 .  The i mba l ance (B-S) at the current tr i a l  pr i ce 
i s  zero . 
2 .  The adj ustment factor i s  sma l l enough that g i ven 
the current i mba l ance no pr i ce change o f  at l east 
one cent can be t r i ed .  
I f  cond i t i on 2 ho l ds when the c l ock str i kes Z ,  then the 
l atest orders subm i tted on the . s i de o f  the market wh i ch 
has excess orders w i l l  not be executed . 
Press -NEXT- to cont i nue or -BACK- to rev i ew .
3 7  
Qu i ck Rev i ew 
1 .  Each per i od you w i l l  be g i ven a set o f  va l ues for 
up t o  s i x  un i t s .  
2 .  Duri ng a per i od there w i l l  be severa l tr i a l s  to 
f i nd a market -c l ear i ng pr i ce ;  you w i l l  be not i f i ed 
on your term i na l  o f  each tr i a l  pr i ce .  You 
w i l l  then enter how many un i ts you w i sh to buy 
at t hat pr i ce and press DATA to con f i rm your order . 
3 .  A fter a l l market part i c i pants have subm i tted the i r  
buy and se l l orders , there w i l l  be 1 5  seconds 
wh i ch y9u w i l l  have to i mprove your order quant i ty .  
The tot a l  number o f  buy and se l l  orders subm i tted 
w i l l  be posted on your screen . 
4 .  I f  dur i ng a 1 5  second i nterva l there are no 
further order quant i t i es entered , the f i na l
i mba l ance w i l l  be ca l cu l ated . The t r i a l  pr i ce 
w i l l  be i ncreased i f  buy orders outnumber se l l  orders 
and decreased i f  se l l  orders outnumber buy orders . 
You w i l l  be asked to subm i t  your order quant i t i es 
at the new pr i ce .  
Press �NEXT� t o  cont i nue or �BACK� t o  rev i ew 
3 8  
Qu i ck Rev i ew 
5 .  The market w i l l  c l ose when the number o f  buy 
orders equa l s  the number o f  se l l  orders , or the 
requ i red pr i ce change wou l d  be l ess than . 5  cents .  
The current tr i a l  pr i ce w i l l  become the market 
c l ear i ng pr i ce .  Your pro f i t  for every un i t  you 
bought at that pr i ce w i l l  be ca l cu l ated for you . 
When there i s  an i mba l ance , the l atest subm i tted 
orders on the s i de of the market w i th the excess 
orders w i l l  not execute .  
Press �NEXT� t o  cont i nue or �BACK� t o  rev i ew 
3 9  
Instructions with order flow information 
Qu i ck Rev i ew 
5 .  The market w i  1 1  c l ose when the number o f  buy
orders equa l s  the number o f  se l l  orders , or the 
requ i red pr i ce change wou l d  be l ess than . 5  cents .  
The current t r i a l  pr i ce w i l l  become the market 
c l ear i ng pr i ce .  Your pro f i t  for every un i t  you 
bought at that pr i ce w i l l  be ca l cu l ated for you . 
When t here i s  an i mba l ance , the l atest subm i tted 
orders on the s i de o f  the market w i th the excess 
orders w i l l  not execute .  
6 .  Whenever no next t r i a l  pr i ce i s  show i ng ,  i t  means 
that i f  nobody subm i ts any further orders be fore 
the c l ock str i kes Z then the current tr i a l  pr i ce 
w i l l  become t he market c l ear i ng pr i ce for the 
current per i od .  
Press �NEXT4 to cont i nue or �BACK4 to rev i ew 
4 0  
B uyer 1 T t a onnemen t A t ·  UC i on 
Per i od 
Un i t 1 2 3 4 5 
Va l ue 4.0".0" . 
1 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Va l ue 3 5.0" 
2 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Va l ue 2.0".0" 
3 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Suppose at t he end o f  tr i a l  * 1  there are 2.0" buy and 1 5
se l l  orders . You tr i ed to buy 2 un i ts at 3 6 .0"  wh i ch gets 
recorded i n  the Pr i ce (BUY) co l umn o f  the l e ft hand box . 
There i s  an excess o f  buys (5) wh i ch gets recorded i n  
the B-S ( Buys m i nus Se l l s) co lumn o f  the l e ft hand box . 
Note that the number o f  buys and se l l s at the current 
pr i ce are shown i n  the center box . 
Press < NEXT> to cont i nue or < BACK > to rev i ew 
Adj ustment factor : 5 . .0".0" 
Next tr i a l  Pr i ce :  3 8 5  f'Tr i a l  B-S P (BUY) Tr i a l  1 Pr i ce I Your current · buy order : 
1 5 3 6.0" (2) � I 2 un i ts I 
Buys Se l l s 
.. .j.. 2.0" i .(2!] I Pro f i tab l e  un i ts � 1 
4 1  
B uyer 1 T t a onnemen t A t .  UC i on 
Per i od 
Un i t  1 2 3 4 
Va l ue 4.0'.0' .. 
1 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Va l ue 3 5.0' 
2 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Va l ue 2.0' .0' 
3 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Above the center box you are a l so shown what the 
next tr i a l  pr i ce wou l d  become (based on the present 
i mba l ance) i f  the current pr i ce does not c l ear the 
market . I f  the i mba l ance (B- S) i s  .0' ,  or the adj ustment 
i s  too sma l l to force a new pr i ce based on the current 
i mba l ance , there w i l l  be n2_n��i_iri§l_�rig� posted .
Tr i a l  
1 
Press < NEXT > to cont i nue or < BACK > to rev i ew 
B-S 
--
5 
Adj ustment factor : 5 . .0'.0' 
Next t r i a l  Pr i ce :  3 8 5  
P (BUY) Tr i a l  1 Pr i ce Your 
3 6.0' (2) EJ 
Buys Se l l s 
current buy 
I 2 un i ts I 
� 0 ·  · Pro f i tab l e  un i ts
4 2  
5 
order : 
= 1 
Instructions without the bid-offer improvement rule 
B uver 1 T t a onnemen t A t ·  UC i on 
Per i od 
Un i t  1 2 3 4 5 
Va l ue 
1 Pr i ce 3 7 5  Pro f i t  2 5  
Va l ue 3 5.0" 
2 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
Va l ue 2 .0".0" 
3 Pr i ce Pro f i t  
There are some restr i ct i ons that w i l l  be p l aced on 
orders you make i n  t h i s  market . As a buyer , you can 
on l y  subm i t  buy orders . In add i t i on ,  once you have 
subm i tted an order at a g i ven t r i a l  pr i ce ,  you can not 
cance l or reduce the s i ze o f  the order . You can however 
i ncrease the number o f  un i t s .  I f  at some t r i a l  pr i ce you 
enter an order to buy 3 un i t s ,  then you may i ncrease the 
order to 4 un i ts ,  but not decrease i t  to .0" , 1 or 2 un i t s .  
Press �NEXT4 to cont i nue or �BACK4 to rev i ew 
Adj ustment factor : 5 . .0".0" 
Next tr i a l  Pr i ce :  
Tr i a l  B-5 P (BUY) Tr i a l  3 Pr i ce Your current buy order : 
2 - 2  3 8 5  ( 1 )  � I 1 uni ts I 1 5 3 6.0" (2) 
Buys Se! l s  
, D  0 1 Pro f i tab l e  un i ts = 1 
4 3  
Full Infonnation with Improven:ient
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